SEMS After Deepwater Horizon

Oil and Gas Operators Have a Lot to Do Before November 15, 2011, to Meet the New SEMS Requirements

Share Print Related RSS
Page 1 of 2 « Prev 1 | 2 View on one page

Copyright © Sutton Technical Books 2011. All rights reserved.

The material in this article is extracted from Ian Sutton’s latest book, Offshore Safety Management due to be published by Elsevier in the fall of 2011, and on Process Risk and Reliability Management (2010). Mr. Sutton will also be conducting a series of seminars on SEMS.

Deepwater Horizon changed everything.

Prior to that event, which occurred in April 2010, safety trends in the offshore oil and gas industry in the United States had been improving steadily for many years, as shown in Figure 1.

The above chart was published by the United States Mineral Management Service (MMS) — the government agency that was responsible for the regulation of offshore safety prior to April 2010. The chart provides data to do with the number of offshore safety incidents for the period 1996-2008. The trend is impressive: In just a twelve year period the recordable injury rate declined from 3.39 to 0.64, a drop of around 80%. The number of lost workdays dropped by a similar percentage. Moreover, the trend is quite smooth and steady, showing that the results are not a fluke or one-time event. And these advances were made as the industry has worked in ever-more challenging conditions — particularly as it has moved into very deep-water operations.

Figure 2 shows a similar positive trend with respect to the industry’s environmental record. The data, which are provided by the United States Coast Guard, include some land-based facilities, and also spills from inshore (state) waters. If the two bars for each of the years in Figure 2 are combined, it can be seen that the amount of oil spilled annually has declined from just under 6 million gallons in the early 1980s to an almost negligible amount by the year 2005.

So up until the year 2010, the offshore oil and gas industry was able to demonstrate a good and steadily improving safety and environmental performance. And then, on April 20, the large and modern drilling platform Deepwater Horizon exploded, burned for about 36 hours and eventually sank. Eleven men died, the nation suffered its worst oil spill and a billion dollars-worth of equipment wound up on the bed of the sea.

In the year that has followed that event an enormous number of changes have been made in the management of safety offshore. Most of the attention has focused on specific drilling issues, particularly the integrity of blowout preventers (BOPs), but there have been sweeping management changes also. One of these changes was to reorganize and rename the MMS; it is now the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE). There was a wholesale change of management at the agency also.

Prior to Deepwater Horizon, the MMS had been working on the safety and environmental management systems (SEMS) rule. One of the consequences of that event was that the agency (now BOEMRE) speeded up the implementation process for SEMS. The rule was finalized in October 2010 (BOEMRE 2010). Companies operating on the outer continental shelf of the United States have to be in full compliance with this rule by November 15, 2011. The rule’s requirements are demanding. Getting into compliance will be a challenge, even for those companies that already have an effective offshore safety management system.

From SEMP to SEMS

For many years the offshore oil and gas industry in the United States had a safety and environmental program (SEMP) standard. The standard was based on the API’s Recommended Practice 75 that was itself published in response to the Piper Alpha disaster of 1988. SEMP is very similar to an onshore process safety management (PSM) program, as can be seen from inspection of Table 1.

The key to SEMP is that it is a voluntary program. RP 75 is a recommended practice. In the year 2004, the MMS had started toward creating their SEMS rule based on just four of the elements in Table 1. Progress was unhurried, and resistance from industry was strong. And then came Deepwater Horizon.

The public response to that event was not favorable to the MMS, which had already suffered considerable criticism based on the highly inappropriate activities of some of its employees (these activities had nothing to do with safety). Therefore, having changed its name, the agency gave high priority to SEMS.

At the heart of the SEMS rule lies the following BOEMRE statement.

BOEMRE is incorporating by reference, and making mandatory, the American Petroleum Institute’s Recommended Practice for Development of a Safety and Environmental Management Program for Offshore Operations and Facilities (API RP 75), Third Edition, May 2004, reaffirmed May 2008. This recommended practice, including its appendices, constitutes a complete safety and environmental management system (SEMS) program.

Simply put, all of RP 75 is now the law of the land. The above quotation also provides a basis for the statement that some companies have made along the lines of, “We are not concerned about SEMS because we already have an effective SEMP.” Such statements are misleading. SEMS is considerably greater in scope than SEMP.

Page 1 of 2 « Prev 1 | 2 View on one page
Share Print Reprints Permissions

What are your comments?

Join the discussion today. Login Here.

Comments

No one has commented on this page yet.

RSS feed for comments on this page | RSS feed for all comments