December 30, 2016, the Washington Post broke the story: “Russian hackers penetrated U.S. electricity grid through a utility in Vermont, U.S. officials say”. There are numerous questions and concerns that arise from this story as malware has been in the US electric grids since at least 2014.
Why do many process control technologies fail to make prime time being relegated to special applications that are few and far between? Here I give what I see as the keys to a technology being successful and widely used in plant applications.
In early 2016, ExxonMobil approached The Open Group to initiate a new open standards activity for a standards based, secure control system. From March to September 2016, ExxonMobil and staff of The Open Group established a “coalition of the willing” comprising end-users in the process control industries and their key suppliers.
In preparation for a new book, I was able to find information about an actual Aurora event. The event affected a non-utility facility (no generator involved) where it experienced multiple Aurora events over a multi-day span resulting in damage to motors.
If the total loop deadtime becomes larger than the open loop time constant, you have a deadtime dominant loop. There is a lot of misunderstanding posed by this difficult challenge including a lot of prevalent myths. Here we look at how we get into this situation, what to expect and...
According to “official” sources, the US electric grid has never been cyber attacked. However, that is not true. There have been several cases where nation-states and others (not identified) have cyber attacked the US electric grid.
Here we finish up the extensive presentation of how to get the most out of your PID. We start with a look at the contribution of each mode and show how to estimate performance metrics from tuning settings and how excessive integral action and insufficient proportional action create oscillations.