The interconnected networking of control and safety systems is making critical safety systems more productive, but more cyber vulnerable, and potentially less safe. Many cyber threats have not been modelled to the same degree as physical safety-related threats including the potential consequences from varying types of cyber attacks.
With all of the focus on cyber security one could expect that DHS is doing a credible job in helping to protect our country. In July 2014, DHS made an error by declassifying much of the Idaho National Lab (INL) Aurora documentation from FOUO to Unclassified. DHS stated the documents...
December 16th, I was hosted by the Center for Cyberspace Research at AFIT to deliver a lecture on ICS cyber security which appeared to be well-received. The lecture was from the perspective of the industrial community. In my view, AFIT is one of the technical leaders in defending ICSs.
December 2nd, I gave a lecture at the Fraunhofer Institute in Darmstadt, Germany on ICS cyber risk. December 9th, I gave a lecture on ICS cyber forensics. The main page for the lecture series is:http://www.ec-spride.tu-darmstadt.de/en/colloquium-industrie4.0/. The video for your first lecture is:https://openlearnware.hrz.tu-darmstadt.de/#!/resource/caveats-in-risk-assessment-in-the-context-of-cyber-attacks-2870
December 2nd, the Cylance report on OpCleaver, Iran attacking critical infrastructures was made public. Unfortunately, the organizations reponsible for protecting our critical infrastructures do not appear to be taking this threat seriously.
The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) has filed a rulemaking proposal with the NRC to REDUCE the number of systems and components to assess for cyber security. Given that nuclear plants are such high value targets and there are so many current malware attacks against control systems, this doesn't make any sense.
There is little information on frequency of ICS cyber attacks. HAVEX and BlackEnergy have been targeting selected ICS vendor HMIs that could be used to give remote access to the attackers. Once your computer is owned there's not much the attacker can't do.
The Convenor of IEC TC57 WG15 sent a note to ISA99 stating that the power industry organizations have additional or different security situations that are causing us to create our own security standards and guidelines. Other than for compliance reasons (NERC CIP), the power industry is NOT different than other...