Control Systems Cybersecurity Expert, Joseph M. Weiss, is an international authority on cybersecurity, control systems and system security. Weiss weighs in on cybersecurity, science and technology, security emerging threats and more.
October 7-9, I attended the IEC TC45A meetings on nuclear plant cyber security. The nuclear plant standards still need to be more control-system focused and to address both malicous and unintentional cyber incidents.
Determination of the potential impact that a cyber incident may have on the ICS should incorporate analysis of all non-digital control mechanisms and the extent to which they can mitigate potential negative impacts to the ICS.
The IEC TC45A nuclear plant cyber security draft standard and the US NEI-0809 guidance explicitly exclude non-malicious cyber incidents. However, the Three Mile Island accident was an unintentional control system cyber incident in part caused by erroneous instrumentation information.
The DRAFT agenda for the 14th ICS Cyber Security Conference the week of October 20th at Georgia Tech in Atlanta is now available at www.icscybersecurityconference.com. The Conference and topics are very timely given the pervasive misinformation that continues to appear.
I will be participating with Palo Alto Networks and an industrial customer on a webinar on network segmentation. The webinar is on September 24th at 11am Pacific and can be found at https://engage.vevent.com/rt/scwc~sept24paloalto?code=PaloAltoA.
Several months ago I was approached by an executive at a large bank. The concern was cyber security of their building controls and the lack of a bridge between the IT security people and the building controls people. This morning, 9/11, I received the following note: "...
I have been invited to give two lectures at the Fraunhofer Institute in Darmstadt, Germany on various aspects of control system cyber security. The first is scheduled for December 2nd and the second for January 6th. The lecture series is called: “A new security culture for "Industrie 4.0".
The electric industry still has done very little other than paper studies to address the Aurora mitigation. DOD is working with two utilities to demonstrate the use of the Aurora hardware mitigation devices. The first utility has provided DOD with several dozen event reports to date.
August 19th, I spent a day with the NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Version 5 Drafting team working on one of the NERC CIP Standards. The focus was on boundary protection, not on the actual control system devices and serial communications which were explicitly excluded.