This paper focuses on the resource that is of greatest concern to most organizations personnel.02/11/2008
Analysis of the ICONICS GENESIS Security Vulnerabilities for Industrial Control System Professionals
A number of previously unknown security vulnerabilities in the ICONICS GENESIS32 and GENESIS64 products have been publically disclosed. The release of these vulnerabilities included proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit code.
While we are currently unaware of any malware or cyber attacks taking advantage of these security issues, there is a risk that criminals or political groups may attempt to exploit them for either financial or ideological gain.
The products affected, namely GENESIS32 and GENESIS 64 are OPC Web-based human-machine interface (HMI) / Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. They are widely used in critical control applications including oil and gas pipelines, military building management systems, airport terminal systems, and power generation plants.
Of concern to the SCADA and industrial control systems (ICS) community is the fact that, though these vulnerabilities may initially appear to be trivial, a more experienced attacker could exploit them to gain initial system access and then inject additional payloads and/or potentially malicious code. At a minimum, all these vulnerabilities can be used to forcefully crash system servers, causing a denial-of-service condition. What makes these vulnerabilities difficult to detect and prevent is that they expose the core communication application within the GENESIS platform used to manage and transmit messages between various clients and services.
This White Paper summarizes the current known facts about these vulnerabilities. It also provides guidance regarding a number of possible mitigations and compensating controls that operators of SCADA and ICS systems can take to protect critical operations.
Learn more about Tofino at www.tofinosecurity.com/blog03/31/2011
This White Paper explains:
- What the 3S CoDeSys vulnerabilities are and what an attacker can do with them
- How to find out what control/SCADA devices are affected
- The risks and potential consequences to SCADA and control systems
- The compensating controls that will help block known attack vectors
A number of security vulnerabilities in the CoDeSys Control Runtime System were disclosed in January 2012. In October 2012, fully functional attack tools were also released to the general public.
While CoDeSys is not widely known in the SCADA and ICS field, its product is embedded in many popular PLCs and industrial controllers. Many vendors are potentially vulnerable, and include devices used in all sectors of manufacturing and infrastructure. As a result, there is a risk that criminals or political groups may attempt to exploit them for either financial or ideological gain.
This White Paper summarizes the currently known facts about these vulnerabilities and associated attack tools. It also provides guidance regarding a number of mitigations and compensating controls that operators of SCADA and ICS systems can take to protect critical operations.12/26/2012
This paper describes an approach to the production of the process automation systems for large-scale pharmaceutical processes using S88.01. The context is the development of highly automated systems concurrently with the project design engineering on a fast-track project.06/23/2008
Enterprises with industrial operations typically utilize at least two types of computer networks Information Technology (IT) - a network that supports enterprise information system functions like finance, HR, order entry, planning, email and document creation; and Operational Technology (OT) - a network that controls operations in real-time. This second type of network supports realtime or control system products, generally referred to as Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, Distributed Control Systems (DCS), Energy Management Systems (EMS) or Manufacturing Execution Systems (MES), depending on the industry.
There has been much discussion and debate around the convergence between Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT). In an effort to provide better visibility and information flow between revenue generating OT assets and enterprise applications, these systems have often been interconnected, in many cases without properly securing the control systems from cyber attack first. If the IT and OT networks are interconnected, yet not properly secured, a breach to one network can easily transverse to the other, leaving the entire computing infrastructure at risk.
At first glance, interconnected IT and OT networks appear to share similar technologies and so a common approach to cyber-security might be indicated. However, upon deeper inspection, many important differences in IT and OT networks will be revealed. The unique characteristics of OT systems and networks preclude many traditional IT enterprise security products from operating safely without impairing operations, and when introduced, can provide significant disruption and downtime to these real-time, revenue generating assets.
This paper is intended to educate IT professionals on the unique requirements of operational technology and what is required to properly secure these networks from cyber attack, so that organizations can assure security, reliability and safety of information and revenue generating assets.02/26/2010
SIL Ratings for Fire and Gas System Hardware10/23/2014
An Integrated System with Batch functions And Front-End Scheduling based on S88 - Application to Beverage Plant -
The case study in this paper illustrates the value of integrating front-end scheduling with a batch control system. Recipe changes, and addition of recipes, occur frequently in the target process. However, since both scheduler and batch packages were designed with the ISA-S88.01 model in mind, these packages could be tightly coupled (well integrated) and, as a result, it is easy to add or change recipes. The frontend scheduler is not limited to performing scheduling; it also provides an easy-to-grasp real-time production status display which can help enhance efficiency and productivity.08/28/2008
Looking for a solution to deter, prevent, detect and mitigate potential threats? Ensuring safety goes far beyond simply installing fail-safe controllers or a safety instrumented system. In fact, to mitigate the risk of serious incidents that can cause injury to personnel, equipment and the environment, it is important to consider safety from all aspects of a plant's operation.05/14/2008
The Pro-face eBrochure provides a comprehensive overview of the Pro-face lineup, as well as detailed features of our powerful HMI development software GP-Pro EX. Easily browse on your tablet or PC. Part numbers, product data, pictures and educational videos--all right at your fingertips!02/11/2014
Recent innovations in model identification, automated testing, and controller operating modes are creating opportunities to bring new efficiencies to the process of sustaining APC controllers.07/03/2013
How can we generate data suitable for modeling while continuing to optimize the operation of the plant?08/19/2013
This paper describes an application of the IEEE 1588 standard to Industrial Automation. Key application use cases are identified that can benefit from time-based control techniques to improve performance results over traditional control methods. This paper will also briefly discuss how the 1588 standard may be adopted to suit these applications. Application problems specific to industrial automation are enumerated and candidate solutions described.01/20/2009
Whitelisting is described by its advocates as "the next great thing" that will displace anti-virus technologies as the host intrusion prevention technology of choice. Anti-virus has a checkered history in operations networks and control systems many people have horror stories of how they installed anti-virus and so impaired their test system that they simply couldn't trust deploying it in production.
While anti-virus systems detect "bad" files that match signatures of known malware, whitelisting technologies identify "good" executables on a host and refuse to execute unauthorized or modified executables, presumably because such executables may contain malware. This is a least privilege approach of denying everything that is not specifically approved.
In this paper the Industrial Defender team performs an independent analysis of a variety of whitelisting solutions for their applicability to control systems. The paper closes with some recommendations related to this technology and areas for further research.02/26/2010
AMS2750D Temperature Uniformity Surveys using TEMPpoint.
Industrial process furnaces and ovens require uniform temperature and heating; This is critical to repeatable product performance from batch to batch. These furnaces require periodic inspection for temperature uniformity.
Electronic and Mechanical Calibration Services, Millbury Massachusetts characterizes temperature uniformity in industrial furnaces and ovens for their customers. This is accomplished by measuring temperature in several locations throughout the furnace and monitoring temperature with thermocouples over time according to AMS2750D specifications.
The customer previously used chart recorders which require constant monitoring while the survey is running. Surveys can run anywhere from 35 minutes to several hours long depending on the industry specified requirements. With the TEMPpoint solution the operator can set it up and let it run unattended, freeing them up to multitask their time and work more efficiently. The shipping TEMPpoint application required very little modification using Measure Foundry and now fulfills customer's requirements.01/06/2010
Faster Decision-Making and Maximized Production Are Achieved While Product Quality Is Maintained05/09/2008
Establishing OPC Communication With the Mark V05/28/2008
This special to the web White Paper explains how alarms historically have been viewed as an entity in and of themselves with little thought given to human factors, and how they might help an operator investigate the root cause of why irrelevant alarms obscure more critical alarms.04/12/2005
This White Paper features extensive information on various types of alarm trips, their effective applications and safety factors, and addresses other considerations that need to be made when implementing an alarm trip strategy.06/24/2006
Something happensa signal peaks or fallsand you need to know. A limit alarm trip triggers the response you need to maintain normal and safe operations. This white paper will show you how to back up your DCS and PLC "soft" alarms with the reliability of "hard" alarms.01/12/2010