DOE recently issued their revised report on Cyber security procurement Language for Energy Delivery Systems dated April 2014. The report is an update on the 2009 INL report. The report states: “Energy delivery systems are used to monitor and control the production, transfer, and distribution of energy. These systems include Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, Energy Management Systems (EMSs), Distribution Management Systems (DMSs), and Distributed Control Systems (DCSs). Energy delivery systems comprise the following:
• The sensors and actuators used for monitoring and controlling energy delivery processes.
• The computer-based systems that analyze and store data.
• The communication pathways and networks that interconnect the various computer systems.
The report goes on to say: “In addition to the language included in this document, acquired products and services should conform to the applicable IT security standards and operations technology (OT) standards for energy delivery systems. This document is designed to provide baseline cybersecurity procurement language for the following:
• Individual components of energy delivery systems (e.g., programmable logic controllers, digital relays, or remote terminal units).
• Individual energy delivery systems (e.g., a SCADA system, EMS, or DCS).
• Assembled or networked energy delivery systems (e.g., an electrical substation [transmission and distribution] or a natural gas pumping station).
The report does a good job of addressing communication networks and traditional IT issues. The report does address malware. However, it does little to address the unique issues of the sensors and actuators, particularly the “design features” that can be exploited via exploits such as Stuxnet. It also is completely silent on Aurora and the need to have intelligent electronic devices that can detect and isolate downstream systems from these types of threats.
One can only wonder why DOE refuses to address these types of issues. It not only leaves systems vulnerable but provides a false sense of security. The report also provides a roadmap for knowledgeable attackers to know what types of threats are not being addressed. This is very similar to what has been done with the NERC CIPs.
Joe Weiss
