Tuesday June 13, 2017 I am giving a paper/presentation at the American Nuclear Society Conference in San Francisco on “The Implications of the Ukrainian Cyber Attacks to Nuclear Plants”. The paper will focus on the impact of compromising protective relays but will also touch on the cyber insecurity of process sensing.
The assumption that network anomaly detection is correlated to physical process anomalies is only true if there is a direct look into the “raw” process. However, network anomaly detection cannot address potential sensor anomalies that occur before the serial-to-Ethernet convertors leading to a false sense of security.
While there are some cases where deadband is helpful, in most applications the effect is extremely detrimental and confusing. Deadband can arise from any sources either intentionally or inadvertently. Deadband creates deadtime and for certain conditions excessive and persistent oscillations.
DoS is typically accomplished by flooding the targeted machine to overload systems and prevent some or all legitimate requests from being fulfilled. However, it does not matter if the service/system is shutdown by the attacker or by the end-user in response to the attacker– the system is still shut down.
This year's will provide numerous conference sessions, training labs, product demonstrations on all the most useful solutions for empowering control and automation personnel, helping them make better-informed decisions, and freeing those interfaces from their traditional constraints.
Hopefully, the book Warning- Finding Cassandras to Stop Catastrophes can reach the appropriate decision makers to help move the needle on cyber securing the control systems in our commercial and industrial infrastructures.
Deadtime is the easiest dynamic parameter to identify and the one that holds the key to better control. Deadtime found visually or by a simple method can tell you what is limiting the ability of the loop and what the remedy is. In most loops, you as the automation engineer...
The April 21, 2017, San Francisco outage should raise red flags at DOE, FERC and NERC about how they classify Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR) and Bulk Electric System (BES) assets. This outage emphatically points out that system reliability, the definition ofkey facilities, and economic impact should be considered...