By
Walt Boyes, Editor in chief
In my keynote address last September to the TĆV Rheinland Safety Symposium, I mentioned the recent accident at the Bayer CropScience facility in Institute, W.V. I pointed out that despite thousands of man-hours of standards writing, training and compliance enforcement, accidents were still happening, and people were still being killed.
Little, apparently, did I know.
On April 21, 2009, the U.S. House Committee on Energy and Commerceās Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations held hearings into āSecrecy in the Response to Bayerās Fatal Chemical Plant Explosion.ā Rep. Bart Stupak (D-Mich.) paints a pretty dismal picture of Bayerās response to what was essentially similar to the incident at Bhopal, India, which destroyed Union Carbide and killed several thousand people. If Congressman Stupak is correct, we havenāt changed much.
[pullquote]According to the subcommitteeās report, Bayer simply got lucky. Less than 100 feet from the blast site was a day tank with 40,000 pounds of methyl isocyanate or MIC. MIC is the same chemical that leaked in 1984 in Bhopal.Ā The subcommitteeās report stated, āThe explosion at the Bayer plant in West Virginia caused a 2½-ton steel vessel containing methymyl to rupture and be violently propelled in a northeasterly direction, leaving a patch of destruction. Had the projectile headed south and struck the MIC tank, the subcommittee today might be examining a catastrophe rivaling the Bhopal disaster. As it happened, the explosion caused shrapnel to damage the protective āblast blanketā around the MIC day tank.ā
Like I said, Bayer got lucky.
It gets worse, believe it or not. The fire department in Nitro, W.V., called Bayer and said, āWe have a cloud of some type that is dark. Itās moving more towards Nitro. Can you please try to get some information, so you can tell us what it is?ā Bayer refused to say what the cloud was and refused to allow emergency first responders on the plant site.
If that wasnāt enough, it gets even worse. For the first time ever, during a U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board investigation of an accident in a process plant, Bayer sought to limit the CSBās use of Bayerās documentation and information by labeling it āSensitive Security Informationā or SSI under the Maritime Transportation Security Act. But William Buckner, CEO of Bayer CropScience, admitted in his testimony to the subcommittee that Bayer invoked SSI out of āa desire to limit negative publicity generally about the company or the Institute facility, to avoid public pressure to reduce the volume of MIC that is produced and stored at Institute by changing to alternative technologies.ā
So we have a company that admits it perverted a law designed to enhance national security, so it could cover up details of an accident just just to avoid publicity.
And if that isnāt enough, read on!
Rep. Stupak asserts, āThe committeeās investigation has uncovered several troubling facts that further raise concerns about an orchestrated effort by Bayer to shroud the explosion in secrecy.ā Bayer removed and destroyed important evidence, and gas sensors and video cameras were apparently not operational on the night of the explosion. Thereās no way to tell if the safety system would have worked, or did work, because major parts of it were turned off.
Rep. Stupak concludes, āBayerās pattern of secrecy raises serious questions, not just about Bayer, but also about whether the law adequately protects the publicās right to have information about potential dangers their communities face and how those dangers might be minimized.ā
Just when are we going to stop doing this kind of thing? When are we going to stop killing people?Ā Ā Ā